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1. Prologue: smuggling cans of tomato sauce 
 
During my first fieldwork in Cuba, in the fall of 2007, a boy with a black 
backpack would appear from time to time at the door of the house where I was 
hosted, looking as if he was doing something illegal. Back then, I still did not have 
much confidence with what I learned later to be called la mecánica (lit. the dynamics), 
or the adjustments that the population had found to face the food shortage, so I 
was more than amazed to discover that the precious burden that, so cautiously, the 
boy used to bring with himself was nothing but cans of tomato sauce. The reason 
for so much care was not in the nature of the load, as I so naively thought, but in 
the way the boy got the cans, which ended up being sold to my host and many 
other customers that had been accumulating over the years. 
The tomato sauce can be considered, with respect to the contemporary Cu-
ban market, one of the luxury goods. Its price, in the state stores that sell industrial 
products in the second local currency (CUC, convertible pesos), is around 2 CUC 
per liter. Considering that the average salary of state workers is around 25 CUC per 
month1, one could guess that it is difficult for a family to regularly buy such a basic 
ingredient for the traditional Cuban cuisine. This explained why the boy with the 
black backpack had founded a good business in selling this simple product. He 
bought cans of tomato sauce from the employees of one of the state’s five-star ho-
tels that adorn the main streets of Havana. The employees made their little fraud by 
declaring that they consumed more tomato cans than they needed with the aim of 
selling them out por la izquierda (lit. on the left, means not following the regulated 
path). Then, the boy sold to other citizens who could not afford the cans regularly 
sold in the stores. Even if the boy loaded his percentage of smuggling on the selling, 
the price of cans was still more convenient than the official one. 
1 Cuentapropistas could usually count on a better salary, but the price of a tomato could be considered 
not that convenient, even for them. Indeed, by accessing the private market, a hairdresser could earn 
about 200 CUC per month and a taxi driver about 700 CUC per month, meanwhile a cardio-surgeon 
on the state’s payroll earns an average of 50 CUC per month.  
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Since then I have repeatedly conducted on-site research activities in Cuba. 
These different rounds of fieldwork were woven together by an attempt to under-
stand what kinds of informal practices Cuban citizens enacted, and which were the 
factors that encouraged my interlocutors engaging in those activities. The purpose 
of this article is thus to account for my findings and show how those income gener-
ating activities are deeply involved in maintaining the Marxist-Leninist system of 
value, although, in the same time, they betray the government and its capacity to 
rule the country.  
 
2. The concept of informality in anthropology, a state of the art 
In the early seventies, the anthropologist Keith Hart coined the term ‘in-
formal economy’ to describe the complex flow of economic activities that do not 
conform with state regulations, because the workers do not have any licenses 
or/and do not pay any taxes (Hart, 1973; Castells & Portes, 1989). The concept of 
‘informal’ was supposed to create a third alternative to the legal vs. illegal dichot-
omy, as well as to point out the existence of an “autonomous social space that be-
longs neither to the public nor to the private sector” (Centeno & Portes, 2006:25). 
Differently from the concept of ‘second economy’, which was usually used to de-
scribe income-generating activities that eluded centrally planned economies in So-
viet Union and Eastern European countries (Alessandrini & Dallago, 1987; 
Sampson, 1987; Łos ́ , 1990), the concept of ‘informality’ was meant to include un-
regulated economic activities taking place in capitalist countries as well. 
Even if both definitions are shaped upon Polanyi’s notion of the economy 
as entirely embedded in society, a sphere of activities that cannot be distinguished 
from politics, kinship or religion (Polanyi, 1957; Graeber, 2001), they enlighten two 
different perspectives of the phenomenon: the perspective of the individuals and 
the aggregate economic perspective (Neveling, 2014). Informality, as described by 
Hart, seems to embrace the individuals’ perspective: sub-proletariat members, to 
survive the disadvantageous inequity of governmental regulations, elaborate creative 
individual solutions to overcome common problems, such as price inflation and in-
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adequate wages (Hart, 1973:61). In a similar way, the Peruvian economist Hernan-
dez de Soto described informality as an act of individual rebellion against ‘mercantil-
ist’ government, or excessive state regulations (de Soto, 1989; Pérez-López, 1995; 
Centeno & Portes, 2006; Coletto & Bisschop, 2017).  
Otherwise, the concept of the second economy shed a light on a different 
level: the impact that these unregulated activities have on the economic system as a 
whole (Sampson, 1987; Łoś , 1990). The entire economic system becomes doubled. 
A shadow marketplace, parallel to the official, could be equally (or more) important 
than the latter in terms of the volume of business, the range of production and dis-
tribution of goods and the number of people involved. Thus, the second economy 
represents not only a correction function to the strictly planned economy but also a 
terrain of political struggle (Pérez-López, 1995:11; Grossman, 1977).  
Contemporary Cuban scholars have rarely applied the concept of second 
economy to the puzzled economic scenario of the country2. The economist Jorge F. 
Pérez-López, stated in 1995, that the concept of ‘second economy’ was the most 
useful framework to describe Cuba’s unregulated income generating activities 
(1995:13). But with the gradual re-introduction of the private market, the frame-
work perimeter became blurred and some scholars started to use this concept to de-
scribe the self-regulated work activities as a whole, even if they were regulated by a 
legal license. Otherwise, the concept of informality is still widely used among both 
Cubans scholars and citizens to describe many income generating activities (Fer-
nandez, 2000). 
Is ‘informal economy’ still a good theoretical framework? In a recent article, 
Patrick Neveling analysed the Mauritius Exporting Processing Zone (MEPZ), one 
of the numerous Special Economic Zones that have been crucial in the participa-
tion to the global market of the so-called peripheral countries3, as a paradigmatic 
2 Michalowski and Zatz wrote The Cuban Second Economy in Perspective, stemming from research carried 
out in the late eighties.  
3 Cuba has recently instituted a Special Economic Zone that, similarly to Mauritius, is an Exporting 
Processing Zone held in the Mariel Harbour. It would be extremely interesting to conduct fieldwork 
there and comparatively analyse the data with Neveling’s work, but foreign researchers are currently 
forbidden to enter the zone.  
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situation to discuss the limit of the ‘informal economy’ concept (Neveling, 2014). 
He affirms that all the social actors involved in the MEPZ economic activities, in-
cluding the state, were aware of the dubious legality of the economic transactions, 
making the dichotomy between formal-informal a less useful framework, but offer-
ing the chance for a sharp critic of the concept. Informality builds upon the idea of 
the existence of several economic activities ignored by or hidden from the state 
(Hart, 1973), Centeno and Portes have underlined this concept by stating that in-
formal economies arise when there is a discrepancy between the ambition of the 
state regulating economy and its actual ability to enforce it (2006:29). Could we still 
use this concept when the state is conniving with the activities? Or when it is the 
state who breaks the rule? Or when the rules are so unclear that one could break 
them without even noticing? Neveling concludes by suggesting considering the dis-
tinction formal/informal as more useful to capture the emic perspective than to 
analyse such patterns (2014:77). 
During my 2012 fieldwork in La Havana, I was investigating the rise of cuen-
tapropistas (lit. those who work for their own account) phenomenon (Cuban citizens 
who got a license to work on their own after the 2011 reform4) and I started by 
separating ‘cuentapropistas’ from ‘informal workers’, by counting in the first group 
those who legally got the license and in the second who kept working privately 
without a formal recognition. It was plausible that, as some Cuban scholar sug-
gested, by enacting a partial reform of the labour market, which allows getting a pri-
vate practice, just a closed number of work categories and leaves out almost all the 
graduated professionals, the government was ‘condemning to informality’ (Henken, 
4 I refer to the plan called Proyecto de Lineamento de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución 
(lit. Guidelines of Economic and Social Policies of the Party and the Revolution), approved by the 
sixth PCC Congress and published on 17 April 2011. It allowed the opening of small and medium 
private enterprises in just explicitly determined work sectors. A Cuban resident could now open a 
restaurant or a hair salon or be a part of cooperative for construction. The aim of this crucial labour 
market reform was to balance the huge wave of dismissals that laid off more than one million work-
ers, ending with what Mujal-León defined the “cornerstone of paternalistic state Fidel Castro had 
founded”: a country that guarantees as many jobs as the active working population needs (Mujal-
León 2011, 155). By mid-2012, the number of private workers appeared to have reached 390,000 
(Oxford Analytics, 17 August 2012) compared to 333,206 in September 2011 (Pavel Vidal & Pérez 
Villanueva 2012). 
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2002) a large group of state workers (Pavel Vidal & Pérez Villanueva, 2012; Brun-
denius & Torres Pérez, 2016; Russo, 2016). In 2013, an integration of 2011 reform 
was introduced to discourage the informal labour market. Public workers were al-
lowed for the first time since 1968 to have a second private job. Since this new re-
form was enacted, university professors or even physicians could, for instance, get a 
license to rent a place for tourists or to sell food (Romanò & León, 2015)5. Despite 
the latter adjustment, many Cuban citizens keep practicing private activities without 
any license6, but informality cannot be reduced to that. During the most recent 
fieldwork I carried out (2016–17), the amount of informal economic activities set in 
place by cuentapropistas left a deep impression on me, thus I started to consider the 
distinction ‘with/without a license’ insufficient to describe the current situation. In 
the same way, to understand the Cuban informality, in both discourse and practice, 
the structural reasons (political and economic) should be considered along with the 
socio-cultural ones. 
The Cuban sociologist Mayra Espina divides the forms that the informal 
economy currently adopts in the country into three main ones: 1) occupational subtrac-
tion qualifies those state workers who extract products from state facilities to sell 
them in the submerged market (for instance those hotel workers who were selling 
tomato cans); 2) unreported economy consists of actions that evade the requirements of 
reporting to government statistical offices, and therefore, the fiscal rules established 
as codified in the tax code. For example, non-recognition of services rendered to 
tourism such as housing, car rental and food services; and 3) illegal or criminal economy 
5 It is maintained that professionals in active employment cannot practice their profession, except for 
those who were self-employed before 1964 and translators-interpreters. On this subject, see Resolu-
tion No. 32/2010. 
6 A survey conducted in 2013 by the International Republican Institute (IRI) with a sample size of 
688 Cuban adults, 15 percent of those polled declared they can be placed in the "informal market". 
Although without considering that the percentage could proportionally correspond to the propor-
tions of workers in the informal sector, the findings confirm that many Cubans continue to work in 
private without official authorization. IRI, "Cuban Public Opinion Survey, January 20 – February 20, 
2013," available at: 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2013%20May%2024%20Survey%20of%20Cuban%20Public
%20Opinion,%20January%2020-February%2020,%202013%20--%20English%20version.pdf. 
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it covers the production and distribution of legally prohibited goods and services 
(Espina, 2010). 
For the aim of this article, I shall focus my attention on the first two forms 
pointed out from Espina, leaving out all those activities that are illegal or criminal 
per se (for instance selling drugs) and add to this list a fourth category, which will 
allow observing the phenomenon from another perspective: the economy of fa-
vours. The latter concept was coined by the anthropologist Alena Ledeneva in 1998 
while she was analysing ‘blat’ (informal exchange network) in Russia, and it has re-
cently been at the verge of a new debate in our discipline (Henig & Makovicky, 
2018). In Ledeneva’s perspective, favour should be considered an ambivalent action 
“that involves the sharing or redistribution of material or non-material resources 
driven by material or non-material incentives associated with maintaining or extend-
ing social relations” (Ledeneva, 2018:26). Thus, doing a favour should be consid-
ered a non-economic way of action with both economic consequences (in the way it 
nourishes the shadow market) and non-economic ones (in the way it nourishes so-
cial connections and self-estimation) (Humphrey, 2018). The ambivalence of favour 
does not only lie in its duality as both economic and non-economic practice but also 
in a sort of ‘double standard’ that made favour networks possible (Yurchak, 1997). 
Indeed, on one hand doing favours implies the willingness to help others, the shar-
ing of a deep feeling of mutual understanding (Ledeneva 1998). On the other hand, 
doing favours involves not only redistribution of personal resources but also of 
public ones, because, and here lies the double standard, stealing from the State is 
considered morally acceptable due to the “pervasive attitude that everybody is doing 
it” (Sampson, 1987:134). 
Stemming from those premises, this article shall discuss what are the impli-
cations of using the concept of informality in the analysis of the puzzled Cuban la-
bour market. I shall follow Neveling’s suggestion that informality is best analysed as 
an emic category, and discuss the practices I could observe and the ones that my in-
terlocutor shared with me in our interviews in the three-fold conceptual framework 
based on ‘occupational subtraction’, ‘unreported economy’ and ‘economy of fa-
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vours’. Those concepts and the dynamics that interplay among them would be con-
sidered both heuristic tools and objects of critical examination.  
 
 
 
3. A three-fold conceptual framework: the research questions  
When the Economic Guidelines were approved during the Sixth Congress 
of the PCC, and then updated in the Seventh Congress on 17 April 2011, the gov-
ernment declared that this modification represented only an ‘update of the socialist 
model’. Despite the changes and the introduction of a form of capital production 
that had no precedent in Cuban socialist design7, the Congress emphasized the idea 
that socialism introduced by the 1976 Constitution was not dying; it simply needed 
to be ‘updated’ to enable the country to move forward economically. Coherently 
with this statement, the Guidelines were presented as a technical process that did 
not need to carry with itself a parallel model of reform of the political structure. As 
stated by the Cuban economist Pedro Monreal González (2014), the government 
expressed in terms of ‘updating’ and not of ‘reform’, evidencing that politics was 
not involved in this change. This decision brought on a storm of neologisms (like 
perpetrating the use of the term ‘cuentapropistas’, which ultimately stands for ‘pri-
vate worker’) and a variable number of dispensations, for instance, the one men-
tioned that allows a doctor to be a private tourist guide, but not to open a private 
medical practice. Neologisms and dispensations are strategically used by the gov-
ernment to maintain the public socialist discourse, but they contribute to making 
the distinction between licit and illicit activities blurred, which, as we will see, has 
deep consequences on social habits as well.  
 In the previous paragraph, I referred to a three-fold conceptual framework 
that combines Espina’s concepts of ‘occupational subtraction’ and ‘unreported 
economy’ with Ledeneva’s concept of ‘economy of favours’. The dynamics tying up 
at least two of those concepts could be unfolded, for instance, in an episode that 
7 Such as the introduction of small and medium private enterprises.  
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occurred during my last fieldwork. In January 2017, the mother of one of my inter-
locutors8 got sick; she was an old lady and she had strong back pain that needed to 
be examined with an X-ray. Her son took her to the hospital and for doing so he 
asked the first favour: a lift from his neighbour who owns a car (personal resource 
favour). Then, after arriving at the hospital, the doctor who examined the old lady 
admitted that sadly he had no film for doing an X-ray; he was expecting to receive it 
in a week and that it would probably take a week more to have it. So, my interlocu-
tor called a friend of his who works in a military hospital9 asking her to resolver (lit. 
to solve, but indicate the ability to find a product not available in the official mar-
ket) an X-ray film (public resource favour). The use of the verb resolver indicates that 
this particular way of acting is not even considered ‘stealing' or ‘subtracting'. This 
makes Espina’s first category somehow blurred. The occupational subtraction does 
not only involve the ‘stealing to sell’ but also the ‘stealing to do a favour’, which 
adds a gradient of complexity to be considered in the analysis. Indeed, the doctor 
who facilitated the X-ray film to her friend was subtracting something from her 
hospital, threatening the public good by stealing, but at the same time, by giving the 
film to a patient from another hospital, she was also guaranteeing that the promise 
of universal access to health care was maintained. But there is something more. 
When my interlocutor could provide via the favour network what his mother 
should have received just for citizen rights, he was also stating in some way he was 
capable to find a personal solution (finding the X-ray film) to a common problem 
(shortage in medical supply). The favour, thus qualifies as an ‘exception’ of the or-
dinary, something that holds the ability of temporary subverting the rules, gifting 
the people involved with a ‘social warmth’. “The pleasure drawn from enacting a 
world in which (…) things can be done differently, albeit just for us, exceptionally” 
(Holbraad, 2018: 230). 
8 Further in this paper, I will present my interviewees and explain why I call them ‘interlocutors’ 
rather than ‘informants’. 
9 Military facilities are known in the country to be the best supplied. To say that “one went to a mili-
tary hospital”, it colloquially means one got the best care possible.  
59 
 
 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 4(2) 2018: 51-78, DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v4n2p51 
 Another example of how the concepts of ‘occupational subtraction’ and 
‘unreported economy’ are tied together could be brought from the ethnographic 
sketch that opens the article. The boy with the backpack buys his supplies from ho-
tel workers, who subtract the tomato cans from their employer’s kitchen (occupa-
tional subtraction). At the same time, he sells those products without a proper li-
cense, thus evading tax rules (unreported economy). Indeed, there is a cheap and 
legal way to buy tomato sauce, for instance, buying the handmade one that could be 
found in farmer’s market, but to access the one sold to the hotels means to access 
something that for its price and distribution chain is, or seems, over the means of 
common citizens. In other terms, by ‘subverting rules’, the act of buying the tomato 
cans from the smuggler adds a symbolic value to the transaction, which is particu-
larly important in those societies where economic capital is scarce (Prost, 2006). 
The X-ray affair and the tomato can smuggler I described are by no means 
archetypical, but they provide what seems to me a good description of the motiva-
tions and concerns that keep in motion both favour networks and other informal 
activities. They also allow a brief reflection on the symbolic capital involved in both 
transactions, which could be considered this sense of ‘subverting rules’. Holbraad 
also referred to favours, but it does not cease to exist when there is also an eco-
nomic transaction on the table. 
 
 
4. Informality and obliquity: a methodological assessment  
During my last fieldwork in La Havana (December 2016–February 2017), I 
collected 25 long non-structured and semi-structured interviews with private work-
ers (cuentapropistas and salaried private staff) and state workers with second informal 
income generating activities, which were selected thanks to the solid non-academic 
network I have built in Cuba during my previous fieldwork in La Habana and Cien-
fuegos. To address a crucial factor such as the role of the family in labour decisions, 
I chose my interviewees in a family group (i.e. parent-child, husband-wife). Indeed, 
I met numerous families that combine different work relationships (i.e. a parent is 
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on the State payroll, the other is self-employed, one child has emigrated and another 
is a salaried private employer, and at least one of them is also operating in the in-
formal market). This economic multi-spatiality (Romero, 2015) has been a privi-
leged feature in the interviewee selection. The interviews, along with notes taken 
every day, local newspapers and visual data (photos and short videos), provided the 
material for my writing.  
My research ethnographic method is inspired by the ‘obliquity’ approach 
suggested by Ledeneva (1998, 2018), which means it relied upon “people’s willing-
ness to share their experiences and framing the most interesting ones in case stud-
ies” (2018: 42). Indeed, as Ledeneva argued, analysing informality means to be able 
to ask your interviewees to talk openly (and while being recorded) about something 
that is considered a secret, in the way it is excluded from formal and official dis-
course, so it requires a solid relationship of trust between the researcher and his/her 
interlocutors. For this reason, the data from the interviews are accompanied by sev-
eral months of participant observation over the past 10 years10. Finally, I consider 
my interviewees ‘interlocutors’ rather than ‘informants’ (Malighetti, 2004). This ter-
minological choice aims to emphasize the fact that I discuss my research aims with 
them before setting a proper interview, and I dialectically consider their forms of 
interpretation while elaborating on mine. This also mean I always disclose to them 
my aims and my role as researcher and ethnographer, and I guarantee anonymity to 
them by using fictitious names and by concealing those demographic characteristics 
that are not essential to the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Another level of difficulty is added from the partiality of the statistical sources. Since ‘informality’ 
could not be considered from formal and official discourse, it is impossible to find national data 
about it. Moreover, even the data that cover the official matter, for instance, labour force distribu-
tion and medium salary, are not completely disclosed by the Cuban government. 
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5. Informality and kinship: two Cuban families as case studies 
 
For the aims of this article, I have chosen two families who know each other 
and live in the same neighbourhood, the Perez and the Delgado families. I shall de-
scribe their daily practices and interpret them in light of the three chosen categories 
of informality. The aim is to critically reflect upon the categories while applying 
them to the ethnographic data gathered.  
 
 
5.1. The Delgado family 
 The Delgado family lives in a suburb of La Havana and, like the Perez I will 
further describe, they are a couple on their second marriage. Leandro (1958) and 
Dulce (1960) were the main interlocutors of the Delgado family and my host during 
three different episodes of fieldwork in La Havana (2010, 2012, 2016–17). Having 
the chance to live with them gave me the possibility to closely observe their daily 
practices and to witness some interesting events, such as the anecdote of the ‘X-ray 
film favour’ I wrote about in the third paragraph of this article.  
Leandro has offspring from his first marriage, which were not involved in 
my research due to their not having so close a relationship with their father. Dulce 
has two sons from her first marriage, which used to live with her and Leandro but 
were both abroad during my last fieldwork. The older son migrated in 2011, while 
his brother left the country in 2016. Although they do not live with Leandro and 
Dulce anymore, Dulce’s offspring play an important role in the Delgado domestic 
economy by sending remittances and providing some white goods, which, as I will 
explain, are not available in the local market. 
 Leandro was a FAR special agent11, a member of the famous counter-
intelligence group that was involved in investigating terroristic threats during the 
Cold War. He retired more than a decade ago, and during my latter fieldwork, he 
11 The acronym FAR stands for Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, literally ‘Revolutionary Arms Force’, 
which is what the military is called in Cuba. 
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was selling handmade chocolates on the informal market. Indeed, he started work-
ing in a sugar manufacturing plant at 17 and got married; then, after serving in the 
military, he decided to enrol in the Armed Forces and graduated in Security Studies 
in Germany to be able to acquire a better military grade. He told me in our first in-
terview in 2012, “I was in the army for almost 30 years. I like what I did. I thought 
it was the best and it was going to last forever, but I was wrong”12. When he retired 
from the army13, he worked in the security staff of a local facility, but then he de-
cided to start to work as a clerk for a farmers market in the neighbourhood where 
he lives with his second wife Dulce, whom he met in 2001. He worked there for 
some years, then he went to work as a clerk for a private tourist shop in the historic 
centre of the city. Then, after one year, he went running the casa particular of a family 
friend, and finally, after two more years, he decided to start an informal enterprise 
with one of his neighbours. They buy chocolate powder and make homemade 
chocolates to be sold, without a license, to café and private clients. 
 Working in the informal market, Leandro makes three times the salary of his 
wife, Dulce, who has been a university professor for almost 30 years. Dulce defines 
herself as “deeply in love with her job”, although, as she told me, she must rely al-
most completely upon her husband and her sons to make ends meet. Indeed, this is 
not an uncommon situation for state workers and for university professors, particu-
larly. The medium level of salary for ‘professionals’ (physicians, architects, lawyers, 
professors and engineers) ranges from 530 to 850 pesos per month, one of the two 
official currencies (comparable to the value of 20–30 CUC, pesos convertibles, the sec-
ond currency, which is equivalent to the American dollar)14. To understand this sal-
12 Leandro never told me why he retired so early from the army. Since he received a special medal of 
honour for his past service during my last fieldwork, I have good reason to think it was probably for 
personal reasons. His stepson described to me the time Leandro was in in the army as “very chal-
lenging” for the entire family, since “he was sent to missions abroad and he could not even let his 
family know where he was and for how long he was staying there” (interview with Fernando, 2010).  
13 It is worth mentioning here that retirement salaries are extremely low, so it is very common that 
after retiring one starts to work on the private or the informal market. 
14 In 2004 the government managed to substitute the US dollar by introducing a second local cur-
rency, the convertible pesos, called CUC. The CUC introduction into the local market dramatically de-
creased the purchasing value of the Cuban state wages. Since then, state workers are living in a pecu-
liar economic paradox. Their salaries are paid in pesos (CUP), which are changed to CUC (25:1), but 
they mostly buy goods in CUC, which became the main currency in the local markets. The double 
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ary purchasing power, it is possible to compare it with the prices of a basket of 
common products, for instance, one bottle of shampoo costs on average 60 pesos; 
1 litre of tomato sauce has the same price; four toilet rolls cost 25 pesos; the prices 
of fruits and vegetables have held steady as well as those of rice, sugar, and bread. 
As shown by the following table, the salaries of school teachers and university pro-
fessors are below the average and have not really increased from 2014 (where, for 
instance, the salary of agricultural workers increased by about 32.6%, the salary of 
sugar plant workers increased by about 23%, and the salaries of professors and 
teachers increased by about 1%). 
 
Table 1 – Medium monthly salary per job category in local currency (pesos). 
Job category 2014 2016 
Agriculture workers 679 1006 
Sugar plant workers 963 1246 
Public health workers 712 816 
Education (teachers/professors) 527 533 
Construction workers 674 985 
Total 584 740 
a Source: author elaboration on data from ONE (National Cuban Agency for Statistics), Cuba 
Statistic Yearbook 2016. 
 
To be able to make ends meet, Dulce, as well as many other Cubans, engaged in 
some informal activities, for instance, giving private lessons or renting a room with-
out a license to foreign university fellows. The latter activity could be considered as 
unreported economy (since she does not have a license to rent a room) but, in some 
way, could also be considered an act of occupational subtraction (since she some-
how exploits her role as a professor to find tenants). During the years between her 
first and second marriage, she told me in our first interview in 2008 that she gave 
private classes to seven kids “to be able to feed her two boys”. Lately, she has been 
helping Leandro in his new enterprise of selling homemade chocolates, which she 
described in our latter interview (February 2017) as “a huge economic relief”. Al-
currency that was held to distinguish foreigners from residents or to protect state socialism from the 
political and economic shock of foreign direct investment, currently points out the gap between those 
who can afford dollar prices and those who cannot afford them. 
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though, describing to me what she owns, she always mentions the formula “thanks 
to the boys” (muchachos, lit. “boys”, which is the way she refers to her two adult chil-
dren). She owns a laptop “thanks to the boys”, she broke her old shaker but she 
could buy a new one “thanks to the boys”, and so on.  
Remittances have a crucial role in the domestic economy of Cuban families, 
reaching 62% of Cuban households and sustaining about 90% of the retail market. 
Money sent from overseas far exceeds the net profits from tourism, nickel, and 
medical products manufactured by the Cuban biotech industry (Ritter, 2013). But 
Cubans leaving abroad do not send just money to their family, they also send white 
goods, such as computers, laptops, mobile phones and other kinds of devices 
which, due to the US embargo, are impossible to find in the local official market. 
The lack of supplies has been feeding the informal market and the mula (lit. mule) 
system. The term mula is colloquially used to refer to those Cubans that, having 
both Cuban and foreign passports15, can import a certain quantity of goods into the 
country, paying the importation tax at the airport. Afterwards, they can sell those 
goods without any regulation (on price, quality or income tax)16. The connivance of 
the state with those forms of unreported economy is paradigmatic in the way the 
government exploits the mula system. By collecting heavy tariffs, the government 
directly profits from this system of importation. Moreover, by allowing the importa-
tion (and implicitly the selling on the shadow market) of many goods that the coun-
try could not import due to the US embargo, the state manages to overcome some 
of the embargo outcomes allowing citizens partial access to the international mar-
ket. 
Leandro acquired chocolate moulds through the help of a friend, who trav-
els as a mula between Panama and Cuba four times per year. He and his wife take 
15 According to many international newspapers covering the news (i.e. Routers agency website), 
more than 70,000 Cubans got Spanish citizenship due to the “grandchildren law”, which, in 2009, 
gave the possibility to all Cubans having Spanish ancestors (namely grandfather, grandmother or 
both) to claim Spanish citizenship. Many of them used their European passport as a migration vec-
tor, but some of them stayed in the island and started traveling back and forth to neighbouring coun-
tries buying goods to sell on the informal market. Unfortunately, official statistics on this topic are 
not available.  
16 Even if the import tax is high and the mula must pay for their own trip, the cost of the product 
they sell still remains lower than the one in the local marketplace. 
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care of the teenage daughter of their friend while she is abroad, and in exchange, 
they receive some ‘gifts’, namely the moulds in this scenario. Using another favour, 
Leandro got the recipe for the chocolates, and, considering he could not officially 
advertise his activity, he runs his business through a complex network of acquaint-
ances. When I asked him how he built his network and how he could reach so many 
clients (he was selling about 700 chocolates per week during my last fieldwork), he 
told me, “You know, there is no socialism in Cuba anymore, what we have left is 
sociolismo (lit. “friend-ism” or “partner-ism.”)” (interview, February 2017). The term 
sociolismo is a colloquial neologism that comes from the term socio, which literally 
means ‘partner’ but is used colloquially to refer to those who belong to one’s ‘fa-
vour network’, and it ironically sounds similar to the term socialismo (Spanish for ‘so-
cialism’) (Cherneski, 2018). Both the potentiality of the favour networks and the 
pervasiveness of informality, while they have certainly played a role in mitigating the 
consequences of ineffective distribution of goods (Ledeneva, 2018), have also nour-
ished the gap between legality and legitimacy (Giordano, 2015), as Cubans tend to 
prefer to circumvent the legal framework via personalised social networks, even if 
not strictly necessary (Russo, 2017). 
Thus, Leandro and Dulce are involved in many informal activities, the main 
one being the selling of chocolates, but they also rent a room in their home to for-
eign scholars, from time to time. They are also involved in various favour networks. 
When I asked Leandro why does he not own a license for the ‘chocolate business’ 
(as he used to call it), he answered that he will eventually get one, but he was waiting 
to “clear his head about the regulation”. He explained to me:  
 
See, those new regulations about cuentaprospistas are so muddled you cannot under-
stand, I went to three different places to know what kind of documents I need to 
formalize my activity and nobody seemed to know clearly about it, should I have a 
pastry lab or am I allowed to do it from home? Could I sell to coffee shops or 
should I be limited to private clients? Nobody gave me clear answers, so I am just 
following the flow and waiting (interview, February 2017). 
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Leandro’s chocolate business falls in Espina’s category of ‘unreported economy’, 
although it is the pervasiveness of the ‘economy of favour’ that makes it feasible. It 
is the embeddedness of informal practices in the moral imagination of citizens that 
makes it a solution that is acceptable to all parties involved (for Leandro who carries 
out the business, for his clients and of course for his family).  
 
5.2. The Perez family 
 The Perez family comes from a little town in the centre of the country, but 
they have been living in a suburb of La Havana for the past 25 years. Luis (1959) 
and Silvia (1962), which have been the main interlocutors of their family during my 
investigation, are both cuentapropistas and former state workers. They have two 
daughters, and they both have offspring from a previous marriage. Silvia has a son 
who migrated in 2012, and Luis has a daughter, a medical doctor who was working 
‘on a mission’ abroad17. During my latter fieldwork, their older daughter was a 
medical student, and the little one was attending secondary school.  
Silvia has graduated in Education Studies and has worked as a school secre-
tary for almost 20 years. Then, when the 2011 Lineamentos re-opened to the private 
market, she decided to quit her state job and started to work as a clerk in a pizza 
parlour near her home, which she described as “I had a better salary and fewer re-
sponsibilities” (interview, January 2017). After a couple of years, she decided she 
was “tired of working for someone else” and convinced her husband to open a 
family run café.  
Luis has graduated in Mathematics. After his bachelor’s degree, he pursued a 
Master of Business Administration and, since 1994, has been the director of a pub-
lic Cuban enterprise. Since he was a high official, he received some benefits from 
the Ministry, such as a mobile phone paid for by the agency, a modern car and a sal-
ary of about 1600 pesos, which were quite good for the Cuban average, as well as 
17 As of 2014, approximately 50,000 Cuban health workers were serving 65 countries all over the 
world. As I argued in a recent article, participating in a health mission abroad was also a good (and 
legal) way for a medical doctor or a nurse to receive some benefits (Russo, 2016).  
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the possibility to work and travel abroad18. Luis was a state worker until 2014 when 
he resigned from his job and opened a ‘casa particular’ (bed and breakfast). He told 
me in our first interview in 2012, although his job was better remunerated than the 
average state job, it was not enough to address the needs of his family. Finally, he 
left the bed and breakfast in 2016 to open a café with his wife. 
Like many Cuban cuentapropistas, Silvia and Luis got their license for their 
café and transformed the terrace of their ground floor apartment into a counter 
where clients could order, retire and pay through the windows for take-away meals 
cooked in the kitchen of their house. On paper, Luis is the owner of the café, Silvia 
is the first employee, and they a have a second employee serving as a cook, Marta. 
But, even though they own a legally obtained license, many or their daily practices 
can be thought of as ‘informal’. For instance, the fact that they have a third em-
ployee, Ada, who helps Marta in the cooking but is not legally employed and, most 
importantly, the way they supply their kitchen. 
Indeed, when I asked Silvia, what does she find challenging in their new en-
terprise, she told me: 
 
Buying the products. I mean food, but also plates and glasses… all you need to run 
a little take-away… We had to rent a car, just for resolver en la calle (lit. solving the 
problem ‘in the streets’, which stands for informal market), and my son sent us 
some nice plates (from abroad) with my sister when she came here visiting. See, the 
problem is you cannot buy wholesale, they want you to buy from the state grocery 
store, which is like “maybe today I will find pasta”, “maybe tomato sauce will dis-
appear for a month” … you know how it is. I got eggs today, how long did we look 
for them? About two weeks (interview, January 2017). 
 
The current Cuban regulations do not allow cuentapropistas to buy wholesale. 
They should buy all the products or raw materials they need for their work activities 
18 The opportunity to travel abroad was, until 2013 (when the law preventing Cuban citizens from 
travelling freely without formal governmental authorization was repealed) and to a certain extent it 
still is, the desired object both symbolically and at a material level. In the latter case, it represented 
the possibility to gain goods not available or at lower prices than on the local market. Symbolically, it 
represented a privileged status and a higher feeling of freedom. 
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from retail state vendors, disregarding the quantity they need. This brings about at 
least two problems: a) by buying raw materials by retail they should charge more for 
their services/products, which will sensibly drop the number of their clients and 
therefore their incomes and b) the state market offers a very limited choice of prod-
ucts and very high prices. The ineffective distribution of goods in Cuba was de-
scribed by the anthropologist Cristina Pertierra with the concept of “frustrated con-
sumption” (Pertierra, 2007:4), the everyday struggle to obtain goods that were hard 
to obtain on the pesos market and that can only be found in chopin, Cubanization of 
the word ‘shopping’, which indicates CUC shops (Pertierra, 2007, 2011). The frus-
trated consumption is caused by two interrelated phenomena. The first one is the 
peculiar economic paradox Cuban citizens have been living since 1993 when the US 
dollar was legalized as a means of payment and then substituted in 2004 by the in-
troduction of a second local currency (CUC). State salaries are paid in pesos (CUP), 
the first currency which is changed to CUC (25:1), but Cubans mostly buy goods in 
CUC, a process that dramatically decreases the purchasing value of their salaries. 
The second one is that, even in the chopin, a lot of products remain a mirage. White 
goods are hard to find, fresh meat and fresh fish are very difficult to buy19 and a lot 
of products are just available now and then. 
 For the mentioned reasons, Luis rented a car that he uses to resolver all the 
ingredients they need for running the café on the informal market, and in his free 
time, he uses the car as an informal taxi, driving around acquaintances in exchange 
for favours or money, depending on the situation. By accompanying Luis during 
one of his grocery shopping trips, I observed the different kinds of informal prac-
tices his shop is based on. He relies on personal favours to know where and when 
the selling will take place or who to call to receive some products (economy of fa-
vours). Moreover, some goods are sold via ‘brokerage’, so he pays a commission to 
the person who helps him acquire the product, for instance, fresh fish caught by 
sailors, unreported and sold through a broker (unreported economy). Finally, some 
19 Processed meat and fish are easier to find, but they have quite a high cost compared to the local 
medium wage; a simple can of tuna costs around 50 CUP (or 2 CUC). 
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products come from informal selling (or donation) of state provisions, for instance, 
the cans of tomato sauce described in the prologue (occupational subtraction).  
In addition to the described practices, since no receipts are needed by law 
(neither for the acquired ingredients nor for the sold meals), it is almost impossible 
to say if the taxes Silvia and Luis pay are fairly measured. Theoretically, they need to 
pay two type of taxes. One fixed monthly tax just to keep their license, and one 
yearly tax that should match the 10 percent of the amount actually gained. Never-
theless, the relatively recent opening to private job market activities has found the 
state policy unprepared to rule the income tax system or at least to have a verifica-
tion system for checking the incomes of cuentapropistas, for instance, there is not a 
clear regulation about receipts20. 
 
Conclusions 
During my fieldwork, I asked my interviewees which are, in their opinion, 
the structural reasons that jeopardize the possibility of a common cuentapropista to 
have a completely legal set of activities. According to their answers and my obser-
vant participation, as I show in the article, those reasons could be summarized as 
follows: a) the state does not manage to enforce the tax rules; b) the uncertainty of 
the rules; c) the ineffective distribution of goods; and d) the proscription against 
buying wholesale (Pavel Vidal & Pérez Villanueva 2014). 
These reasons are, indeed, economically challenging for those who are 
building their private enterprises, but their political and cultural meaning should not 
be considered less important than their economic impact in term of favouring in-
formal over legal frameworks of action. For instance, the ineffective distribution of 
goods is not only affecting consumption by creating frustrating consumers as de-
scribed by Pertierra (2007, 2011) but also representing the failing of the rationing 
system. Indeed, the average salary and those few products received through the li-
20 Except for the “casas particulares” (lit. private houses, local term for “bed and breakfast”), which 
have a register where they need to put all the room fees, they are also subject to stricter government 
control, as they usually host foreigners. 
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breta system21, for instance, and the other gratuities have stopped supplying the 
population with necessities since the second half of the 2000s. This failing, paired 
with a centrally planned economy where some products could only be acquired le-
gally by distribution, not only created the condition for people to get used to the ex-
change of products and favours but also corroborated the idea that those activities 
were necessary family survival strategies, although they were illegal and still were 
(and are) considered legitimate (Giordano, 2015). 
As for the other mentioned reasons, the unenforced tax regime, the uncer-
tainty of the rules and the proscription against buying wholesale seem to be double 
bonded with the resilience of the planned economy system. Despite many scholars 
speaking about Cuba in terms of ‘transition’ (Leiva, 2000; Ritter, 2005; Feinberg, 
2013; Brundenius & Pérez, 2015), a theory that posits transition is “a progressive set 
of stages along a unidirectional path from communism to capitalism” (Phillips 
2007:334), contemporary Cuba is hardly on its way toward a free market and liberal 
democracy, inasmuch as we consider those phenomena as ideal typical conceptions. 
Neveling criticizes anthropology's common notion of the “working of markets”, 
because it is “often built on the premises of a historical shift from regulated markets 
to self-regulated markets” or in Polanyi's terms from “human economy” to “market 
economy” (Neveling, 2014: 69; Polanyi, 1957, 1977). Cuba seems a good case study 
to challenge this bias, not only because, due to the continuity of the PCC leadership, 
this historical radical shift never happened but also because both forms of political-
economic regimes are cohabiting and dialectically merging together. For instance, by 
not allowing cuentapropistas to buy wholesale, the government is trying to control and 
limit size and incomes of the relatively new private sector. On the other hand, by 
evading these rules by buying their supplies on the informal market, the cuentapropis-
tas are re-defining in their own terms their relationship with the state.  
Damián Fernández (2000), analysing Cuban informal economy, suggested 
considering it as both one of the most formidable adversaries of the Socialist state 
21 The libreta (lit. little book) is a kind of monthly coupon providing basic goods, such as eggs, 
chicken, rice, bread, beans, etc. 
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and an instrument that provides citizens with enough creativity to escape it and to 
deal with the socialist asset. Emma Phillips, who investigated the outcomes of the 
Special Period and the consequent labour market reform that introduced the cuen-
tapropista figure, pointed out that Decree 141 of the Law (1993)22 has brought a “le-
gal creation of an anomaly”, leading cuentapropistas to “embody an increasing tension 
between Cuba’s socialist past and uncertain future” (2007:312). What Phillips 
wanted to stress by using the paraphrase “legal creation of an anomaly” is that the 
partial reformation of the labour market, which allowed private jobs just in certain 
sectors23, has contributed to shaping a different type of economy that is difficult to 
define legal or informal per se, but which floats between the two domains.  
Thus, using the term ‘informal economy’ or informality as a theoretic 
framework to describe the daily practices of Cubans to make ends meet could be 
considered not completely satisfying. As Neveling suggested in the case of Mauri-
tius, the term ‘informality’ is certainly useful to describe the local or emic point of 
view but to analyse those practices it would be useful to focus on the micro-
dynamics and micro-processes enacted by subjects, while they are coping with un-
certainties in the transformations of the market. Stemming from those premises, I 
found that Espina’s tripartite definition (occupational subtraction, unreported 
economy and criminal economy) combined with Ledeneva’s concept of economy of 
favour could be the most appropriate theoretical framework for an in-depth ethno-
graphic analysis of contemporary Cuban practices. First, the concept of occupa-
tional subtraction describes well the tendency, common in post-Soviet countries, to 
consider ‘stealing from the state’ perfectly legitimate, because, as Ledeneva ex-
plained, “the illegitimacy of private property, legitimizes the use of public property” 
(Ledeneva 2018:31). Secondly, the concept of unreported economy, made to de-
22 In late 1960, when the ‘Sovietisation’ of Cuban society began, private workers still existed. Most of 
them were peasants and drivers, but there were also physicians, optometrists, dentists and veterinari-
ans. The Decree 141 of Law (1978) stated the possibility of private practice to the people who 
graduated before 1959. The Decree 141 of Law allowed 55 job activities, and 117 more were allowed 
in 1995 (Phillips, 2007). Then, no new licenses were released until 2011.  
23 For the complete list of authorized categories for self-employment, see Gaceta Oficial, No. 027, 
Special Edition, Resolution 42/2013, 26 September 2013, Annex. 
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scribe all these economic activities exerted without a license, is also useful to over-
come the dichotomy ‘with or without license’, because, as the gathered data suggest, 
even where there is a registered license, we can still find some unreported economic 
activities. Finally, the concept of economy of favour points out that not all the ex-
changes and the subtractions are operated for economic advances, some of them, 
by building or corroborating networks, are instrumental not only for individuals but 
also to the survival of institutions. For instance, the anecdote of the X-ray film 
shows how the individuals, by subtracting from a better supplied facility and redis-
tributing via favours, contribute to sustaining the fair access to public health ser-
vices. 
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